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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL AMUSEMENTS, dba,
ADULT BOOK AND CINEMA STORE,
STUART LEE, DAVID ANDREW PAULY,
HERSEL RICHARDSON, JR., and
KENNETH BLAIR CLEVELAND,

Case No.
14535

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty and sentence
of each defendant for distributing pornographic material.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Each appellant has been separately charged for.
distributing pornographic material in violation of Utah
Code Annotated, 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended.

The case was

tried to a jury which entered a verdict of guilty against
each defendant.

Each defendant was subsequently sentenced

by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist presiding.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants respectfully request this Court to
set aside the convictions on the grounds that the Court
erred in its instructions to the jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants were convicted by a jury and sentenced
by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist for having distributed
pornographic material in violation of Utah Code Annotated/
Section 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Judge
gave the following instructions to the jury:
INSTRUCTION NO. 4
Before you can convict the defendant
HERSEL RICHARDSON, JR., of the offense
charged you must find all the following
elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. That on or about the 9th day of
December, 1975, the defendant did sell
State's Exhibit IP within Weber County,
State of Utah.
2. That the Exhibit is in fact
illegal pornography. Illegal pornography
is defined as material that contains the
following elements:
A. That the material is offensive
under local contemporary community standards, when taken as a
whole, and it appeals to the
prurient interest in sex.
B. It is patently offensive in the
description or depiction of
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual
excitement, sado-masochistic
abuse, or excretion.
C. Taken as a whole, it does not
have serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
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All reasonable doubt in favor of the
publication should be resolved so as to
promote freedom of speech and expression,
then
If you find both of the above elements
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it is
your duty to convict the defendant; if
you do not so find, it is your duty to
acquit the defendant, HERSEL RICHARDSON, JR.
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
Before you can find defendant STUART
LEE guilty of any of the counts in question,
you must find all the elements of that count
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
COUNT IV
1. That on or about December 9, 1975,
there was sold and displayed for sale
State's Exhibit 4P within Weber County,
State of Utah, by the defendant.
2. That the Exhibit is in fact illegal
pornography. Illegal pornography is defined
as material that contains the following
elements:
A. That the material is offensive
under local contemporary community standards, when taken as a
whole, and it appeals to the
prurient interest in sex.
B. It is patently offensive in the
description of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement,
sado-masochistic abuse, or
excretion.
C. Taken as a whole, it does not
have serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
All reasonable doubt in favor of the
publication should be resolved in its favor
so as to promote freedom of speech and
expression, then
If you find both of the above elements
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your
duty to convict the defendant; if you do not
so find, it is your duty to acquit the
defendant. Each count is to be considered
separately as though it was an independent
case.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 6
Before you can find the defendant KENNETH
BLAIR CLEVELAND guilty of the offense charged
as either to Count II or Count III, you must
find the following elements proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
1. That on or about the 5th day of
December, 1975, the defendant did sell
State's Exhibit 2P within Weber County,
State of Utah or as the count considered
may be.
A. That on or about the 5th day of
December, 1975, the defendant
did sell State's Exhibit 3P
within Weber County, Stcite of
Utah.
2. That the exhibits in fact aire
illegal pornography. Illegal pornography
is defined as material that contains the
following elements:
A. That the material is offensive
under local contemporary community standards, when taken as a
whole, and it appeals to the
prurient interest in sex.
B. It is patently offensive in the
description of nudity, sexual
conduct, sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, or excretion.
C. Taken as a whole, it does not
have serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
Such must be true as to the books
considered separately as to Counts II and III.
All reasonable doubt in favor of the.
publication should be resolved in its value
so as to promote freedom of speech and
expression, then
If you find both of the above elements
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your
duty to convict the defendant; if you do not
so find, it is your duty to acquit the
defendant. Each count is to be considered
separately as though it was an independent
case.
INSTRUCTION NO. 8
Before you can find DAVID ANDREW PAULY,
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defendant, guilty of any of the counts in
question, you must find all the elements
of that count proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Count I.
1. That on or about December 9, 1975,
there was sold and displayed for sale
State1s Exhibit IP within Weber County,
State of Utah; and that he was the manager
of the corporation and knew or should have
known that such a book was displayed for
sale, and that persons were employed for
the purpose of the sale.
2. That the Exhibit is in fact
illegal pornography. Illegal pornography
is defined as material that contains the
following elements:
A. That the material is offensive
under local contemporary community standards, when taken as a
whole, and it appeals to the
prurient interest in sex.
B. It is patently offensive in the
description or depiction of
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual
excitement, sado-masochistic
abuse, or excretion.
C. Taken as a whole, it does not
have serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
Count II.
The elements are the same as above except
the alleged sale was on December 5, 1975,
State's Exhibit 2P, is to be considered.
Count III.
The elements are the same as above except
the alleged sale was on December 5, 1975,
State's Exhibit 3P, is to be considered.
Count IV.
The elements are the same as above except
the alleged sale was on December 9, 1975,
State's Exhibit 4P.
If you find any of the Counts proven,
that is both elements thereon, it is your duty
to convict of that count; if you do not so
find, it is your duty to acquit of that count.
Each count should be considered with the same
dignity and diligence that you would consider
if it were the only charge.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 9
Before you can find the defendant corporation INTERNATIONAL AMUSEMENTS dba
ADULT BOOK AND CINEMA STORE, guilty of
the offense charged, you must find all of
the following elements proven:
Count I.
1. That on or about December 9, 1975,
there was sold and displayed for sale
State's Exhibit IP within Weber County,
State of Utah; and that the corporation's
local managing authorities knew or should
have known that such a book was displayed
for sale, and that persons were employed
for the purpose of the sale.
2. That the Exhibits are in fact
illegal pornography. Illegal pornography
is defined as material that contains the
following elements:
A. That the material is offensive
under local contemporary community standards, when taken as a
whole, and it appeals to the
prurient interest in sex.
B. It is patently offensive in the
description or depiction of
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual
excitement, sado-masochistic
abuse, or excretion.
C. Taken as a whole, it does not
have serious literary, artistic,
political or scientific value.
Such must be true as to the books considered
separately as to the Count I.
Count II.
The elements are the same as above except
the alleged sale was on December 5, 1975,
State's Exhibit 2P, is to be considered.
Count III.
The elements are the same as above except
the alleged sale was on December 5, 1975,
State's Exhibit 3P, is to be considered.
Count IV.
The elements are the same as above except
the alleged sale was on December 9, 1975,
State's Exhibit 4P.
If you find any of the above counts proven,
that is both elements thereon, it is your duty
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to convict of that count; if you do not
so find, it is your duty to acquit of
that count. Each count should beconsidered with the same dignity and
diligence that you would consider if
it were the only charge.
INSTRUCTION NO. 14
Contemporary community standards means
those current standards in the vicinage
where an offense alleged under this action
has occurred.
Nudity means the showing of the human
male or female genitals, pubic area, or
buttocks> with less than an opaque
covering, or; the showing of the female
breast with less^ than an opaque covering,
or any portion thereof below the top of
the nipple, or the depiction of covered
male genitals in a discernably turgid state.
Sexual conduct means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching
of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals,
pubic area, buttocks, or, if the person is
a female, breast, whether alone or between
members of the same or opposite sex or
between humans and animals in an act of
apparent or actual sexual stimulation or
gratification.
Sexual excitement means a condition
of human male or female genitals when in
a state of^sex^ual stimulation or arousal,
or the sensual experiences of humans
engaging in or witnessing sexual condtict
or nudity.
Sado-masochistic abuse means
flagellation or torture by or upon a
person who is nude or clad in undergarments,
a mask, or in a revealing or bizarre costume,
or the condition ofbeing fettered, bound or
otherwise physically restrained on the
part of one so clothed.
INSTRUCTION NO. 15
The test is not whether it would arouse
sexual desires or sexual impure thoughts in
those comprising a particular segment of the
community, the young, the immature or the
highly prudish or would leave another segment,
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the scientific or highly educated or the
so-called worldly-wise and sophisticated
indifferent and unmoved.
The test in each case is the effect
of the book, picture or publication
considered as a whole, not upon any
particular class, but upon all those
whom it is likely to reach. In other
words, you determine its impact upon the
average person in the community. The
books, pictures and circulars must be
judged as a whole, in their entire context,
and you are not to consider detached or
separate portions in preaching a conclusion.
You judge the circulars, pictures and
publications which have been put in evidence
by present-day standards of the community.
You may ask yourselves does it offend the
common conscience of the community by
present-day standards.
In this case, members of the juiry, you
and you alone are the exclusive judges of
what the common conscience of the community
is, and in determining that conscience, you
are to consider the community as a whole,
young and old, educated and uneducated, the
religious and the irreligious--men, women
and children.
Appellants submitted jury instructions to the Court
which do not appear in the records filed with the Utah Supreme
Court, but do appear as having been submitted on Page 166
of the transcript of the trial.
Furthermore, the appellants objected to the
instructions as given on pages 171 through 173 of the transcript
of the trial.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS NO. 4, 5
6, 8 AND 9 IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
MANDATED AND STATUTORILY REQUIRED ELEMENT OF SCIENTER.
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In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the
United States Supreme Court invalidated a California statute
which made it unlawful for a bookseller to have obscene
material in his possession, even though he had no knowledge
of its content or character.

In expressing the fear that

the elimination of scienter would inhibit and curtail free
expression, the Supreme Court declared:
"By dispensing with any requirement,
of knowledge of the contents of the book
on the part of the seller, the ordinance
tends to impose a severe limitation on
the public's access to constitutionally
protected matter. For if the bookseller
is criminally liable without knowledge
of the contents, and the ordinance
fulfills its purpose, he will tend to
restrict the books he sells to those he
has inspected; and thus the State will
have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally
protected as well as obscene literature.
* * * And the bookseller's burden would
become the public's burden, for by
restricting him the public's access to
reading matter would be restricted. If
the contents of bookshops and periodical
stands were restricted to material of
which their proprietors had made an
inspection, they might be depleted indeed.
The bookseller's limitation in the amount
of reading material with which he could
familiarize himself, and his timidity in
the face of his absolute criminal
liability, thus, would tend to restrict
the public's access to forms of the
printed word which the State could not
constitutionally suppress directly. The
bookseller's self-censorship, compelled
by the State, would be a censorship
affecting the whole public, hardly less
virulent for being privately administered.
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Through it, the distribution of all
books, both obscene and not obscene,
would be impeded." -- 361 U.S. at
153-154.
In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966), the
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a book publisher
under a New York obscenity statute which ostensibly
contained no scienter requirement.

Although the statute

appeared to impose strict liability, the Court noted that the
New York Court of Appeals had interpreted the statute to
require the vital element of scienter.

The Court quoted the

New York Court's interpretation which held that:
A reading of the [New York]
statute. . . as a whole clearly indicates that only those who are in some
manner aware of the character of the
material they attempt to distribute
should be punished. . . 383 U.S. at
510.
The Court concluded that this construction foreclosed a
challenge to the statute based on Smith v. California, supra.
Most recently, the Supreme Court in Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), declared:
"We think the 'knowingly1 language of 18 U.S.C. §1461, and the
instructions given by the District
Court in this case satisfied the
constitutional requirements of
scienter. It is constitutionally
sufficient that the prosecution show
that a Defendant had knowledge of the
contents of the materials he
distributes, and that he knew the
character and nature of the materials."
418 U.S. at 123.
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In line with these pronouncements of the United
States Supreme Court, numerous state courts have held that a
Defendant cannot be-convicted ,of an obscenity offense unless
the prosecution proves beyond a^r-easonable doubt that the
Defendant had knowledge of the material's contents*

State v.

Locks, 97 Ariz.. 148, 397 P. 2d 949 (1964); State v. Oman,
265 Minn.:H277; 121 N.Wi:2d 616 (1963); State v. Richardson,
506 S.W. 2d 483 4Mo*App* 1974).

Of course, such knowledge

can be inferred by the jury based on the circumstances
surrounding the distribution or sale., Parrish,-v. State,
521 S.W. 2d 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); State v. American
Theatre Corp., 193 Nebr. 289, 227 N.W. 2d 390 (1975).
The Utah legislature has also recognized that
knowledge of the material?}s contents is an essential element
of distributing pornographic material.

Utah Code Annotated,

Section 76-10-1204, 1953, as amended, states:
(1) A person is guilty of distributing pornographic material
when he knowingly. . . .
Theword "knowingly" is defined in Utah Code Annotated,
Section 76-10-1201 (4), 1953, as amended, as:
An awareness, whether actual or
constructive of the character of
material, or of a; performance.
Yet, despite the opinions of the United States
Supreme Court and the: declaration of the Utah Legislature
that knowledge of the material's contents is an essential

-12-

element for conviction under §76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated,
the trial court failed to so instruct the jury.

A glance at

the jury instructions given with respect to the defendants
Richardson, Lee and Cleveland demonstrates that the jury
could have determined guilt without giving any consideration
as to whether these defendants had any knowledge of the
contents of the material.

Jury instructions nos. 4, 5, and

6 are identical:
That on or about the 9th day of
December, 1975, the defendant did
sell state's exhibit. . . .
No mental element precedes the word sell in the instructions.
Liability appears to be strict.

Nor was the statutory definition

of 'knowingly1 given in instruction 14 where numerous other
statutory definitions found in 76-10-1201, Utah Code Annotated^
are set out.
The almost identical situation faced the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Keene v. Commonwealth, 516 S.W. 2d 852
(Ky. Ct. App. 1974).

In Keene, the trial court failed to

instruct the jury that the defendant could be found guilty
only if the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant had knowledge of the material's obscenity.
reversing, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated:
Appellant asserts that prejudicial
error was committed in the instructions
given to the jury. We are forced to agree.
KRS 436.101 provides in pertinent part:

In
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"Any person who, having knowledge
of the obscenity thereof. . . exhibits
. . . any obscene matter is punishable."
The trial judge failed to instruct on the
required ^element of knowledge ,;„ which is
an essential part of the statutorily
created offense. The error was properly
preserved for review. The instructions
were otherwise acceptable against a
claim of prejudicial error. For the
omission of an element of the crime from
the instruetions, the judgment must
regretably be reversed for a new trials
On a new trial the jury will be
instructed aa our: statute plainly requires
that they must believe that the defendant
l!
had knowledge of the obscenity of the
film."
See, also, Cohen v. State, 125 So. 2d 560 at 563 (Fla. 1960).
Turning to jury instructions 8 and 9, which defined
the elements of liability to convict the defendants Pauly and
International Amusements, Inc., it is obvious that once again
the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the essential
element of knowledge as defined, in 76-10-1201 (4), Utah Code
Annotated.

While these instructions do require that Pauly

(jury instruction no. 8 ) , and the local managing^authority
of International Amusements, Inc. (jury instruction no. 9 ) ,
have knowledge or reason to know the materials were offered
for sale, neither instruction requires any knowledge of the
character or content of the material.
The failure of the court to instruct the jury on both
the constitutionally mandated and statutorily required element
of the offense was prejudicial error and as such the defendants
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are entitled to a new trial.

See, Cohen v. State, supra;

Keene v. Commonwealth, supra; State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123,
396 P. 2d 749 (1964); 23 C.J.S. §1194.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT THE. MATERIAL WAS TO BE JUDGED BY A STATEWIDE
STANDARD.
Jury instruction no. 14 states:
Contemporary community standards means
those current standards in the vicinage
where an offense alleged under this
action occured.
Obscenity is to be judged by community standards.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); State v. Phillips,
540 P. 2d 936 (1975); §76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated.

But,

the Supreme Court in Miller or in any subsequent decision
dealing with obscenity has not defined the exact "meets and
bounds" of the community.

This task was left up to the

individual state courts and legislatures.
418 U.S. 153 (1974).

Jenkins v. Georgia,

The clear majority of state high courts

considering the issue have held that a material's obscenity must
be judged by a statewide community standard.

Court v. State,

^63 Wis. 2d 570, 217 N.W. 2d 676 (1974); State v. J-R Distributor;
Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P. 2d 1049 (1973); People v. Heller,
352 N.Y.S. 2d 601, 307 N.E. 2d 805 (1973); Pierce v. State,
292 Ala. 472, 296 So. 2d 218 (1974); People v. Tabron, 544 P. 2d
380 (1976); People v. Thomas, 346 N.E. 2d 190 (111. Ct. App. 197

-15-

The logic behind employing a statewide community
standard was clearly spelled out by the Alabama Supreme Court
in Pierce v. State/ supra•
Alabama would be faced with many
problems in determining the exact
scope of the community if it were
smaller than the state as a whole.
On first impulse, one would think that
the county would be an appropriate
geographical unit for establishing
standards because one assumes a
natural relationship between the
county and the jury vicinage. However,
this assumption is not always accurate,
for in Alabama, there are a number of
counties that have judicial divisions
separating geographical areas in a
county with separate courthouses for
each such area. Prospective jurors
that are assembled for trial selection
in such counties come from within the
bounds of such geographical divisions
and cannot be representative of the
entire county. Such judicial geographical divisions (which are even applicable
to the circuit courts) within such
counties present problems pertaining
to localized standards on a countywide
basis.
Assuming for the sake of argument
that standards will vary from county to
county, then arguably, the standards
may also vary from city to city.
Moreover, taking the assumption one
step further, there may be within a
given city different standards, say
in residential neighborhoods as opposed
to the areas surrounding a college
campus and, perhaps, a trial court
judge would have to deal with a number
of standards. This myriad of possibilities for standards, coupled with the
temporal requirement that standards be
"contemporary" clearly demonstrates the
burden which would be placed on the
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judicial system in drying to determine
which standards are applicable at
which location at which time.
Furthermore, if « » « t l
»
e
11
construed to be an « > f ^ "
^ s
the state, then the problem arises as
to wnethlr standards must be proven by
extrinsic or « P « * ' " S f f t ; ^ or
S E f t u ^ " ; " ^ T t S
^ n a t i o n
-^ilVeme/ro^thfefbod^nt"
of ' the community. then proof of standards
for the toy's sake would be superfluous.
If a judge without a jury is allowed to
t,vl
i-hp same determination under the
stme concept then there would be no need
° T " ° f ipellftflourfbeTnformfd as
r w h I " l t r d a r d f : e S applied below,
under this alternative method an appellate
cSurt could make no independent * f ^ i n a "
tiSn of the issue of obscenity vel non.
The results under such a system would
cause many disparities in criminal
cSnvfcuSns. While under our system of
federalism it is fundamental and
^slrable for the national government
" ^rndfrL'^ere^is'nrunLflying.
rns?iatudt?onai or policy basis mandating
deference to "local communities and to
= do so most certainly would lead to abuse
of criminal process. 296 So. 2d at 224.
A state obscenity statute must employ a statewide community
standard,
The leaislature has provided us
with a d e l a t i o n of community standards
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penalties for the violation of a
state obscenity statute without
knowing what the standard is that
will determine his guilt or
innocence. The random decision of
a judge or jury cannot be the
standard, and the state statute
should not be construed in a
different manner in Denver,
Littleton, Grand Junction,
Colorado Springs, and Aspen.
People v. Tabron, 544 P. 2d at 381
(197.6..U
In the present case, a look at jury instruction no. 14
indicates that the jury was given no guidance and clarity as to
the relevant community.

Thus, it would have conceivable

determined the defendants1 guilt by considering the impact of
the materials on a community more limited than the state of Utah.
More than likely, the material was judged by its effect on
citizens of Ogden.

But, what would have been tolerated in-

Salt Lake City might have been deemed shocking in Ogden.

The

failure of a trial court to instruct the jury on a statewide
community standard has been held to be reversible error by
numerous courts.

Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. 79, 205 S.E. 2d 119

(Ga. App. 1974); People v, Andrek, 375 N.Y.S.. 2d 40 (N.Y. Supreme
Ct. 1975).

The defendants would urge this Honorable Court to

follow the logic of these courts and reverse the convictions,
since jury instruction: no•.,.-..•1-4 was an unclear and erroneous
statement of the law.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY
THAT IN EVALUATING THE CONSCIENCE OF THE COMMUNITY, THEY COULD
CONSIDER CHILDREN AS PART OF THAT COMMUNITY.
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Jury instruction no. 15 states in part:
In this case, members of the jury, you
and you alone are the exclusive judges
of what the common conscience of the
community is, and in determining that
conscience you are to consider the
community as a whole, young and old,
educated and uneducated, the religious
and the irreligious--men, women and
children.
A state is free to adopt more stringent controls on
communicative materials available to youths than adults.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Erzoznick v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).

Thus, as to some materials,

sales to adults may be a constitutionally protected activity,
while sales of the same material to minors may be barred and
punished.

State v. Siegel, 354 A. 2d 103 (N.J. Super. 1976).
Material which is protected for
distribution to adults is not
necessarily constitutionally protected
from restriction upon its dissemination
to children. In other words, the
concept of obscenity or of unprotected
matter may vary according to the group
to whom the questionable material is
directed or from whom it is quarantined.
Because of a State's exigent interest
in preventing distribution to children
of objectionable material, it can
exercise its power to protect the
health, safety, welfare and morals
of its community by barring the
distribution to children of books
recognized to be suitable for adults.
Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. at 636.
Were the materials in the present case sold or made

available to children, there is no doubt that the jury could ha\
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considered the impact of the material on juveniles.

But, from

the record, it is crystal clear that not a scintilla of evidence
was ever presented to show sale or availability of the material
to minors.

Indeed, the defendants were never charged with

distribution of obscene materials to minors.

It takes little

common sense to realize that material which may be "highly
prurient" to children will in some cases not even phase an adult.
Yet, under^ jury instruction no. 15, the :jury was pemitted to
judge the material as to its possible effect.on children.
While the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that certain special obscenity instructions may be given with
r&gar:d* to standards^, there-: must be evidence to support such
instructions.

In Mishkin v. New York, supra, the,Court held

that where evidence established that books were..marketed for
a clearly defined deviant groups%he prurience of the material
could be measured by the effect on members of that group.

In

Ginzberg v. United States, -383 U.S. 463 1X966) , evidence of
pandering was admissible to establish the element of prurience.
Unlike the above two cases, there was no evidence
before the court to justify an instruction whichallowed the
jury to speculate as to the materials effect on children.
Indeed this portion of the jury instruction was contrary to
§76-10-1203 (2), Utah Code Annotated, which states:
In any prosecution dealing with
an offense relating to pornographic
material or performance, or dealing
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in harmful material, the question
whether material or a performance
appeals to prurient interest in sex
shall be determined with reference
to average adults or average minors

as the case may be.
The statute makes it clear that where sales are alleged to be
solely to adults, the relevant community in determining pruriency
is an adult one.
As given, jury instruction no. 15 was not supported by
the evidence, contrary to the direction of §76-10-1203 (2),
and prejudicial to the defendants.

Its damaging effect requires

that the defendants be granted a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The appellants1 convictions should be reversed and
a new-trial granted i;Q-each of them for the Court's failure totproperly instruct the jury.
Respectfully submitted,
FLORENCE AND HUTCHISON

BRIAN R. FLORENCE
818-26th Street
Ogden, Utah
84401
Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
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